Mark Stille

A detailed re-examination of Midway, one of the most significant battles in the Pacific Theater of World War II. In April 1942, the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy was at the zenith of its power. It had struck a severe blow against the US Navy at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, before spearheading the Japanese advance through Southeast Asia and rampaging across the South Pacific. Only a few months later, in June 1942, the US Navy managed to inflict a decisive defeat on this mighty force off Midway Atoll and the strategic initiative in the Pacific Theater passed to the US Navy. Midway is one of the most mythologized battles of World War II. The traditional view of the battle, popularized in its immediate aftermath and surviving through to the present day, is of a heavily outnumbered American force snatching victory in the face of overwhelming odds. This view is simplistic and, in many respects, wrong. Pacific War expert Mark E. Stille provides a detailed analysis of this pivotal battle, and argues that Midway was neither a miraculous American victory, nor a product of good fortune, but that the plans, personalities, doctrines, ships and weapons of the two sides meant that a Japanese defeat was the more likely outcome. This up to date study provides an unparalleled level of insight and thorough analysis into one of the decisive moments of the Pacific War.

A detailed re-examination of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Day of Infamy that saw the USA enter World War II.In this the first comprehensive treatment of Pearl Harbor since the early 1990s. respected Pacific War naval historian Mark E. Stille traces the road to war and the Japanese attack itself. He examines the role of the man behind the operation, Japanese Admiral Yamamoto, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the plan. The American preparations for an attack are also carefully reviewed. The heart of the book is a comprehensive narrative of Pearl Harbor along with an appreciation of its results placed in proper perspective.In common with many of the major campaigns of the Pacific War, many myths surround the Battle of Pearl Harbor, and, amongst others, Mark explores and dismantle the myth of Yamamoto as a military genius, as well as the myth that the attack was brilliantly planned. Long regarded as brilliant strike, Mark argues in Pearl Harbor that the attack was instead a tactical disappointment, an operational failure and a strategic disaster.

Lavishly illustrated, this book studies the role of airpower in the New Guinea battles of 1942–43, as the Allies checked and halted Japan''s last significant offensives. Mark Stille and John Rogers offer a new history of a previously neglected part of the South Pacific air war - the battles over New Guinea and the waters around it. The first of two books on the subject, drawing on Japanese, American and Australian sources, it details operations from February 1942 until April 1943, which saw the Allies stop the last Japanese efforts to expand their faltering empire.Allied air operations focused on denying the Japanese the use of the sea to send reinforcements to New Guinea, during the battles for Buna and Gona, the unsuccessful and little-known Japanese invasion at Milne Bay, and the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in which a major Japanese effort to move troops to New Guinea was crushed by air power. While the Japanese had over-extended and lost operational focus, the Allies were successful in interdicting sea movement of Japanese forces to New Guinea. However, immature tactics meant air power was largely ineffective supporting their ground campaign. Packed with photos, superb original battlescenes, 3D diagrams and maps, this book explains the roles of Japanese and Allied air power in the crucial battle of New Guinea.

This fully illustrated book assesses the trial of strength between US Navy PT boats and Japanese destroyers operating in the Solomon Islands during 1942–43.During the Solomons fighting, the IJN was forced to rely on destroyers to move men and materiel to its forward garrisons. Conducted at night to avoid American air power, these missions, first seen during the struggle for Guadalcanal, were dubbed the Tokyo Express. Unable to derail the Tokyo Express by using its destroyers, the USN deployed PT boats off Guadalcanal from October 1942; sinking one destroyer and damaging another.As the fighting moved into the Central Solomons, the USN attempted to disrupt the build-up of Japanese forces on New Georgia Island and other Japanese strongholds by using cruisers and destroyers, but this approach resulted in heavy losses. PT boat operations were increasingly important after the Japanese turned to barges to move troops and supplies.Full-colour artwork and mapping and carefully chosen archive photographs complement vivid battle narratives and shrewd analysis in this lively account of the ships and men fighting on both sides in the crucial Solomon Islands campaign at the height of World War II. Renowned authority Mark Stille explores the background to this epic clash of arms, charts its course during 1942–43, and offers insights into the performance of both sides in this pivotal campaign of World War II in the Pacific.

''A worthy addition to any bookshelf.'', The Naval Review A fascinating re-examination of the battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval encounter in history and probably the most decisive naval battle of the entire Pacific War.Leyte was a huge and complex action, actually consisting of four major battles, each of which are broken down in detail in this book, using original sources. The plans of both sides, and how they dictated the events that followed, are also examined critically.So much of the accepted wisdom of the battle has developed from the many myths that surround it, myths that have become more firmly established over time. In this new study, Pacific War expert Mark Stille examines the key aspects of this complex battle with new and insightful analysis and dismantles the myths surrounding the respective actions and overall performances of the two most important commanders in the battle, and the “lost victory” of the Japanese advance into Leyte Gulf that never happened.